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1. INTRODUCTION
In many repeated interactions, repetition is not guaranteed but instead must be
agreed upon. Workers can quit, customers can walk away, and couples can break up.
If it is possible to strategically exit from a repeated interaction, the ordinary repeated-
game framework no longer applies. Ordinary repeated games assume that the same set
of players play the same stage game repeatedly for a ¯xed (possibly in¯nite) length of
time. Therefore no player has a choice to exit from the game. At the other extreme,
random matching games1 assume that in every period a player is randomly matched
with a new partner. Therefore no player has a choice to continue the game with the
same partner. However, many economic situations are in an intermediate case where
players can play a game repeatedly, but they can also terminate the interaction. There
is a growing literature of these \endogenously repeated" games.
In this literature, three issues have been mainly analyzed. First, under complete
information, ordinary trigger strategies do not constitute an equilibrium since coop-
eration from the beginning of a relationship is vulnerable to defection and running
away. Instead, gradual cooperation or trust-building strategy becomes an equilibrium.
(Datta, 1996, Kranton, 1996a, Fujiwara-Greve, 2002, and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-
Fujiwara, 2009.) Second, gradual cooperation is also useful in incomplete information
models to sort out the types of players. (Ghosh and Ray, 1996, Kranton, 1996a,b,
Watson, 2002, and Furusawa and Kawakami, 2008.) Third, a modi¯ed folk theorem
holds with appropriate lower bounds of the equilibrium payo®s. (Yasuda, 2007.)
We add a new angle to the analysis of the endogenously repeated games by looking
at the interaction between in-game behavior and what a player may receive outside of
the game. In game theory, often the outside structure of a game is ¯xed and the analysis
is focused on in-game strategic outcomes given the outside structure.2 By contrast in
other research ¯elds such as search theory and operations research, the main interest
lies in the e®ect of outside structural changes on individual behavior/decision-making,
but there is no strategic interaction among decision-makers. In this paper we consider
strategic interaction of two players under varying outside structures of the game.
Speci¯cally, we examine variants of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma from which
players can exit by taking an outside option and investigate e®ects of outside option
1See for example, Kandori (1992), Ellison, (1994), and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995).
2However, there are some papers that perturb the game structure to see the e®ect on in-game
behavior. See the discussion below.
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P1 n P2 C D
C 7, 7 0, 9
D 9, 0 1, 1
Table 1: An Example
structures on the sustainability of cooperation. It turns out that the \locked-in" feature
of ordinary repeated game is a very strong cooperation enforcement system. The
existence of a relevant outside option (greater than the in-game punishment payo®)
increases the necessary level of discount factor to sustain cooperation as compared
to the one in ordinary repeated games, and in some cases for any discount factor
cooperation is not possible. However, within the outside option model, the relative
di±culty of repeated cooperation is dependent on the structure of outside options.
In particular, if the option values are uncertain, in some cases it is easier to sustain
repeated cooperation than when they are certain. Therefore, perturbation of outside
options is not always bad for cooperation.
Let us give an example to explain the logic. In each period, as long as the two
players are in the game, they play the Prisoner's Dilemma of Table 1. After playing
the Prisoner's Dilemma, an outside option is available to Player 1. Player 2 has no
such option. The game repeats (Prisoner's Dilemma and then the outside option to
exit) as long as Player 1 does not take the outside option. Suppose that in any period
the available outside option is the same, and it gives a stationary sequence of payo®
f6; 6; : : :g to Player 1 after exit. Player 2's payo® after Player 1 ends the game is
normalized to be zero.
Note that if the game is an ordinary repeated game without the outside option, the
in¯nitely repeated cooperation (C;C); (C;C); : : : (which we call the eternal cooperation)
is sustainable by the grim trigger strategy if
7
1¡ ± = 9 + ±
1
1¡ ± () ± =
1
4
:
However, if the outside option is available, Player 1 can choose D and take the option
f6; 6; : : :g. Therefore, Player 1 may not follow the eternal cooperation (C;C); (C;C); : : :
even if ± is not so small. For example, when ± = 0:6,
7
1¡ ± = 17:5 < 18 = 9 + ±
6
1¡ ± :
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This illustrates that the existence of an outside option greater than the in-game pun-
ishment payo® creates di±culty in achieving cooperation, in the sense that the range
of discount factors that sustain repeated cooperation shrinks.
Next, suppose that Player 1 has two possible outside options of the form f6+ ²; 6+
²; : : :g and f6¡ ²; 6¡ ²; : : :g (where ² > 0), and these arrive with equal probability at
the end of each period. The average outside option is 6. When ² is small (i.e., less
than 1), then there is no point of taking any of the outside options if players are to
repeat (C;C). When ² is large enough, however, the better outside option exceeds the
payo® from the repeated (C;C) so that the in¯nitely repeated cooperation becomes
impossible for any ±. However, Player 1 may cooperate until she receives the better
option. Let us compute the total expected discounted payo® of cooperation until the
better option arrives. Let V be the continuation value at the end of a period, before an
option realizes. Then the total expected payo® of repeating (C;C) until f6+²; 6+²; : : :g
arrives is of the form 7 + ±V , where the continuation value V satis¯es the following
recursive equation.
V =
1
2
¢ 6 + ²
1¡ ± +
1
2
(7 + ±V ):
For example, when ² = 1:5 and ± = 0:6, then V ¼ 18:39, and the value of the
cooperation is increased to 7 + ±V ¼ 18:03 > 17:5 = 7=(1¡ ±).
The value of a one-shot deviation also needs to be checked more carefully. The
optimal exit strategy for Player 1 is either to exit immediately by taking any option or
to wait for f6 + ²; 6 + ²; : : :g. If she deviates and then waits for the good option while
su®ering from the punishment payo® of 1 in the stage game, the total expected payo®
is of the form 9 + ±W , where the continuation value W satis¯es
W =
1
2
¢ 6 + ²
1¡ ± +
1
2
(1 + ±W ):
Thus 9 + ±W ¼ 17:46 for ² = 1:5 and ± = 0:6. If Player 1 defects and then exits
immediately by taking any option, the expected payo® is 9 + ± 6
1¡± = 18 as before.
Therefore, in this example, it is optimal to exit immediately after a deviation. However,
7+±V > 18 = 9+± 6
1¡± implies that Player 1 with ± = 0:6 cooperates on the play path,
until the better outside option arrives. We call this play path stochastic cooperation. It
is better than no cooperation, which is the case if the outside option was deterministic.
The above example shows that deterministic or stochastic structure of outside op-
tions makes a di®erence in sustaining cooperation for mid-range discount factors. In
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addition, given a discount factor, we can investigate how the spread ² of the outside
options a®ects the sustainability of cooperation. In this example, when ² is small, no
cooperation is possible, just like in the deterministic case. As ² increases, the value
of cooperation while waiting for the good option increases so that stochastic coopera-
tion becomes an equilibrium behavior.3 This can be generalized for a mid-range of ±.
Therefore the perturbation of outside options may enhance cooperation.
Moreover, we can vary the probability of the binary options and show qualita-
tively same results: when the better outside option exceeds the cooperation payo®, the
stochastic cooperation becomes an equilibrium for mid-range discount factors. Hence,
as the probability of the attractive option decreases, the stochastic cooperation lasts
longer on average, and the play path becomes almost the eternal cooperation.
There are a few papers which incorporate perturbations into ordinary repeated
games. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) perturb payo®s of the stage game, while Baye
and Jansen (1996) and Dal B¶o (2007) perturb the discount factor. In these models the
optimal (eternal) cooperation levels are shown to be lower than the one in the absence
of perturbation. In this sense, the perturbations are bad for cooperation. Although
they did not investigate the lower bound of the discount factors by ¯xing a level of
cooperation, it would be greater than the one under no perturbation. This is clari¯ed
in Yasuda and Fujiwara-Greve (2009).
The key is that the players are locked in the game forever in the in¯nitely re-
peated games. Therefore, when the perturbation creates di±culty to cooperate (a high
deviation payo® or a low value of the discount factor), the players need to play a non-
cooperative action in that period, which reduces the on-path payo®, i.e., the incentive
to follow the equilibrium strategy. Therefore the players need to be more patient than
in the deterministic case.4
By contrast, in our outside option model, Player 1 can choose between playing
the game forever and stopping. Thus, when the perturbation creates a di±culty to
cooperate (a high outside option), it does not mean that Player 1 must endure the low
payo® of a non-cooperative action. The di±culty to cooperate means that stopping
the game is more bene¯cial, and hence she can take that option to increase the on-path
payo®, i.e., the incentive to follow the equilibrium strategy. Therefore lower discount
3As ² increases more, e.g., ² = 2:5, then 9+ ±W > 9+ ± 61¡± so that after defection, Player 1 wants
to wait for the better option. However, 7 + ±V > 9 + ±W holds so that the stochastic cooperation
continues to be an equilibrium behavior.
4A similar argument is noted in Mailath and Samuelson (2006), p.176-177.
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factors are su±cient to sustain the equilibrium as compared to the deterministic case.
In summary, we have shown that there are perturbations that can increase the value
of repeated cooperation, and this occurs naturally in the context of outside options in
the endogenously repeated game.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the basic one-
sided outside option model. In Section 3, we show that the existence of a deterministic
outside option makes it harder to cooperate than in the ordinary repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma. In Section 4, we consider a one-sided stochastic outside option model and
show that stochastic outside options may enhance cooperation, as compared to the
deterministic options. In Section 5, we give two extensions. One is a two-sided outside
option model, in which the e®ect of perturbation is weakened because a player may
end up with a bad option when the opponent receives a good option and terminates
the game. This reduces the values of both cooperation and punishment phases and
weakens the perturbation e®ect. The other is a continuous distribution of (one-sided)
outside options. The results are essentially the same as the ones of binary distributions.
Section 6 gives concluding remarks.
2. A ONE-SIDED OUTSIDE OPTION MODEL
Consider a two-player dynamic game as follows. Time is discrete and denoted
as t = 1; 2; : : : but the game continues endogenously. At the beginning of period
t = 1; 2; : : : as long as the game continues, two players, called Player 1 and Player 2,
simultaneously choose one of the actions from the set fC;Dg of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
The action C is interpreted as a cooperative action and the action D is interpreted
as a defective action. We denote the symmetric payo®s associated with each action
pro¯le as5: u(C;C) = c, u(C;D) = `, u(D;C) = g, u(D;D) = d with the ordering
g > c > d > ` and 2c > g + `. See Table 2. The latter inequality implies that (C;C)
is e±cient among correlated action pro¯les.
After observing this period's action pro¯le, Player 1 can choose whether to take
an outside option and thus terminate the game or not. The game continues to the
next period if and only if Player 1 does not take an outside option. We assume that
all actions are observable to the players. Therefore, in period t = 2, players can base
their actions on the history of past action pro¯les. The outline of the dynamic game
is depicted in Figure 1.
5The ¯rst coordinate is the player's own action, and the second coordinate is the opponent's action.
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P1 n P2 C D
C c, c `, g
D g, ` d, d
Table 2: General Prisoner's Dilemma
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Figure 1: Outline of the Dynamic Game
As the basic setup, let an outside option be a deterministic, stationary stream of
payo®s fv; v; : : :g, such that c > v > d.6 One can alternatively assume that an outside
option is a one-shot payo® of the form v=(1 ¡ ±), where ± is the common discount
factor. Other outside option structures (stochastic, two-sided) are discussed in later
sections.
Player 2 receives payo® only from the Prisoner's Dilemma as long as the game
continues and Player 2 does not have the ability to end the game, as in the ordinary
repeated games. Let us also assume that d = 0 which implies that Player 2's \outside
payo®" 0 is not better than the payo® from (D;D). This simpli¯es our analysis by
making Player 2's deviation not relevant. (To be precise, the qualitative result does
not change as long as Player 2's outside payo® is not greater than v.)
There are many economic situations that ¯t into this model. For example, we can
interpret the model as a buyer-seller model such that Player 1 is a buyer, Player 2 is a
seller, C is an honest action in transactions and D is a dishonest action. We can also
6If v > c, then (C;C) cannot be played at all, and if v < d, then the outside option is never taken
so that the game essentially reduces to an ordinary repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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interpret the model as an employment relationship such that Player 1 is a worker and
Player 2 is a ¯rm.
We assume that both players maximize the discounted sum7 of the payo® stream
with a common discount factor ± 2 (0; 1). For example, if Player 1 takes the outside
option at the end of T -th period, her total payo® is
TX
t=1
±t¡1u(a(t)) + ±T
v
1¡ ± ;
while Player 2's total payo® is
TX
t=1
±t¡1u(a(t));
where a(t) is the action pro¯le in t-th period of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
As the equilibrium concept, we use subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE henceforth).
The game is of complete information.
Lemma 1. The following strategy combination is a SPE for any v 2 (d; c) and any
± 2 (0; 1): In any period of the game, Player 1 and Player 2 play D and Player 1 takes
the outside option, regardless of the history.
Proof: Given the strategy combination, both players get d in every period if they are
in the game. Therefore, at any exit decision node, taking the outside option is optimal
for Player 1 since v > d. Given Player 1's exit strategy, it is optimal for both players
to play myopically in every period (if they are still together).
Notice that Player 1 can guarantee herself the total payo® of d + ± v
1¡± against
any strategy of Player 2 by choosing D and exiting immediately, while Player 2 can
guarantee d + 0 against any strategy of Player 1. Since the above SPE (called the
\myopic SPE" henceforth) achieves exactly these payo®s, it is the maximal equilibrium
punishment.
We investigate the range of ± in which repeated mutual cooperation of (C;C) is
sustained as long as possible. If the maximal equilibrium punishment does not sustain
the on-path action pro¯le, no other punishment would, by the same logic as the op-
timal penal code in Abreu (1988). Hence it is su±cient to consider the myopic SPE
7Alternatively one can assume that the players maximize the average payo®s without changing the
qualitative results.
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as the punishment. Therefore, in general we consider the following type of strategy
combinations, which we call \simple trigger strategy" combinations. Note that Player
1's optimal exit strategy varies depending on the outside option structure.
Cooperation phase: If the history is empty or does not have D, play (C;C) and
Player 1 uses an optimal exit strategy given that (C;C) is repeated as long as the
game continues.
Punishment phase: If the history contains D, play (D;D) and Player 1 uses an
optimal exit strategy given that (D;D) is repeated as long as the game continues.
3. DETERMINISTIC OUTSIDE OPTION
When the outside option is deterministic, c > v implies that Player 1's optimal
exit strategy in the cooperation phase is not to take the option, and v > d implies
that the optimal exit strategy in the punishment phase is to take the option at the
¯rst opportunity. Therefore, the play path of the simple trigger strategy combination
is the eternal cooperation. Let us ¯nd the lower bound of ± that sustains the eternal
cooperation, that is, that makes the simple trigger strategy combination a SPE.
Recall that in the ordinary repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with discounting, the
eternal cooperation is sustained by the simple trigger strategy without the exit option
if and only if
c
1¡ ± = g +
±d
1¡ ±
() ± = g ¡ c
g ¡ d =: ±:
In our game, Player 1 does not deviate in the cooperation phase if and only if
c
1¡ ± = g +
±v
1¡ ± (1)
() ± = g ¡ c
g ¡ v =: ±
D
1 (v); (2)
and Player 2 does not deviate in the cooperation phase if and only if
c
1¡ ± = g () ± =
g ¡ c
g
=: ±D2 :
Let ±D(v) = maxf±D1 (v); ±D2 g. Then the simple trigger strategy combination is
a SPE if and only if ± = ±D(v). Moreover, v > d implies that ±D1 (v) > ±, and
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d = 0 implies that ±D2 5 ±. Hence ±D(v) = ±D1 (v) > ±. This means that, for any
± 2 [±; ±D(v)), the existence of an outside option, greater than the mutual defection
payo®, makes the eternal cooperation impossible, while it was possible if the game
were an ordinary repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is also easy to see that ±D(v) is
increasing in v, implying that better outside option makes it harder to cooperate.
Since limv!c ±D(v) = 1, the range of ± that sustains the eternal cooperation shrinks to
the empty set, as the outside option approaches to c.
Proposition 1. For any v 2 (d; c), the eternal cooperation is sustained as the outcome
of a SPE if and only if ± = ±D(v) > ±. Hence, for any ± 2 [±; ±D(v)), the eternal
cooperation cannot be sustained in the outside option model, while it is sustainable in
the ordinary repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
Alternatively, given ± 2 [±; 1), we can de¯ne the highest outside option level v¤(±)
which makes Player 1 not to deviate in the cooperation phase by
c
1¡ ± = g + ±
v¤
1¡ ±
) v¤(±) := 1
±
fc¡ (1¡ ±)gg: (3)
Clearly, v¤ is increasing in ±, v¤(±) = d, and lim±!1 v¤(±) = c. Since Player 2 does not
deviate for ± = ±, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given ± = ±, the eternal cooperation cannot be sustained if and only if
the outside option v exceeds v¤(±).
Two remarks are in order. First, although we focus on the repeated play of (C;C),
one might wonder that if players play (D;C) occasionally, it may reduce the su±cient
level of the discount factor. Playing (D;C) has two e®ects. One is that it is possible to
lower the su±cient discount factor for Player 1 to follow the strategy. The other is that
Player 2 must have incentive to play (D;C). Therefore it is not always the case that
playing (D;C) can reduce the su±cient discount factor. In fact, under some parameter
condition, (C;C) is the easiest action pro¯le to sustain. For details see Appendix A.
Second, so far we have assumed that the outside option is a single stationary se-
quence fv; v; : : :g. If di®erent sequences become available over time, the cooperation
may fall apart, even if most of outside options are unattractive, i.e., below v¤(±).
To see this, ¯x ± and suppose that at the end of each period t, a sequence fv(t); v(t); : : :g
is the outside option and there exists the smallest integer T < 1 such that v(T ) >
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v¤(±). That is, T is the ¯rst time that the outside option exceeds v¤(±). Then at the
end of period T , Player 1 would exit (given that the players play (C;C) as long as they
are in the game), and thus the players would not play (C;C) in T .
Therefore, deterministic °uctuations of outside options do not make cooperation
easier. By contrast, in the next section we consider stochastic outside options such
that in each period the actual outside option is random. Even if the players know that
eventually an attractive option arrives, the uncertainty of the timing can make the
mutual cooperation possible until the realization. This is a striking di®erence from the
above deterministic and °uctuating option case.
4. STOCHASTIC OUTSIDE OPTIONS
In this section we consider the case that Player 1 receives stochastic outside options
at the end of each period from an i.i.d. distribution. The randomness can be inter-
preted several ways, such as subjective uncertainty, external perturbation, or a draw
from a distribution of options. To make the comparison with the deterministic case,
throughout this section we ¯x the mean of the distribution equal to v 2 (d; c).
The stochasticity of the options changes both the value of cooperation phase and
the value of the punishment phase so that in addition to the eternal cooperation and no
cooperation, the stochastic cooperation (cooperation until a stochastic end of the game)
may become the play path. Then it is possible that the volatility of the payo®s changes
the on-path play from no cooperation to the stochastic cooperation, as we discussed
in Introduction. Note that, in the single deterministic outside option model, under
the myopic equilibrium punishment, (C;C) is repeatedly played for a ¯nite number of
periods if and only if the eternal cooperation is sustained. However, in the stochastic
outside option model, this equivalence does not hold.
4.1. Symmetric Binary Distributions
In this subsection we focus on a simple binary distribution of outside options:
fv + ²; v + ²; : : :g and fv ¡ ²; v ¡ ²; : : :g for some ² > 0, which becomes available with
probability 1=2 each.8 With this formulation we can see the e®ect of the mean v and
the spread ² of the distribution separately.
8Alternatively we can assume that only the next period option becomes known and future option
values are still random. If the one-shot payo® of v + ²1¡± and v ¡ ²1¡± obtain with equal probability
in each period, then taking the option v + ²1¡± (resp. v ¡ ²1¡± ) in a period and receiving the same
random sequence afterwards gives the same expected payo® of v+²1¡± (resp.
v¡²
1¡± ).
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Unlike the deterministic outside option cases analyzed so far, it may not be optimal
for Player 1 to exit immediately in the punishment phase under the stochastic options,
even though the average is still v > d. Thus we ¯rst clarify the optimal exit strategy
for Player 1 in the cooperation phase and in the punishment phase respectively, and
then we derive the lower bound of ±.
Suppose that repeated (C;C) is expected as long as the game continues. Since
c > v¡ ², in any period, either taking only the option of v+ ² or not taking any option
is the optimal strategy. Let V be the continuation payo®, measured at an exit decision
node, when Player 1 takes only the option of v + ². While waiting for the good option
the players play (C;C) repeatedly. Thus V satis¯es the following recursive equation:
V =
1
2
³v + ²
1¡ ±
´
+
1
2
(c+ ±V ):
To explain, with probability 1=2, Player 1 receives the good option v + ² which she
takes and thus the continuation payo® becomes (v + ²)=(1¡ ±). With probability 1=2,
Player 1 receives the bad option v ¡ ² in which case she stays in the game and follows
(C;C) in the next period and faces the same distribution of the outside options at the
end of the next period. In this case the continuation payo® is c + ±V . Explicitly, we
have
V =
1
2
( v+²
1¡± ) +
1
2
c
1¡ ±
2
=
v+²
1¡± + c
2¡ ± : (4)
If Player 1 does not take any outside option, the continuation payo® is c=(1 ¡ ±).
Therefore, not taking any option is optimal in the cooperation phase if and only if
c
1¡ ± = V () (2¡ ±)c = v + ²+ (1¡ ±)c from (4)
() c = v + ²:
In summary we have the following characterization of the optimal exit strategy in
the cooperation phase.
Lemma 2. When (C;C) is expected as long as the game continues, not taking any
outside option is the optimal exit strategy for Player 1 if c = v+ ², and taking only the
good option v + ² is optimal otherwise.
Analogously, suppose that repeated (D;D) is expected as long as the game contin-
ues. Since d < v + ², either taking only the option of v + ² or taking any option is the
GRIPS Policy Information Center Discussion Paper : 09-10
12
² 5 v ¡ d v ¡ d < ²
± 5 ±P (v; ²) ±P (v; ²) 5 ±
c = v + ² cooperation phase No exit No exit
punishment phase Take any option Take only v + ²
v + ² > c cooperation phase Take only v + ² Take only v + ²
punishment phase Take any option Take only v + ²
Table 3: Player 1's Optimal Exit Strategy
optimal exit strategy. Let W be the continuation payo®, measured at an exit decision
node, when Player 1 takes only the option of v + ². While waiting for the good option
the players play (D;D) repeatedly. Thus W satis¯es
W =
1
2
³v + ²
1¡ ±
´
+
1
2
(d+ ±W );
and hence
W =
v+²
1¡± + d
2¡ ± : (5)
If Player 1 exits immediately by taking any outside option, the continuation payo® is
1
2
( v+²
1¡± )+
1
2
( v¡²
1¡± ) =
v
1¡± . Therefore, waiting for the good option v+ ² in the punishment
phase is optimal if and only if
W = v
1¡ ± ()
v+²
1¡± + d
2¡ ± =
v
1¡ ± from (5)
() ± = v ¡ d¡ ²
v ¡ d : (6)
Let ±P (v; ²) = maxfv¡d¡²
v¡d ; 0g. The superscript P stands for the punishment phase.
Thus, we have the following characterization of the optimal exit strategy in the pun-
ishment phase. The optimal exit strategies are also summarized in Table 3.
Lemma 3. When (D;D) is expected as long as the game continues, taking only the
good outside option of v+ ² is the optimal exit strategy for Player 1 if ± = ±P (v; ²), and
taking any outside option is optimal otherwise.
We now ¯nd the lower bound of the discount factor ± to sustain repeated mutual
cooperation as long as possible, using the simple trigger strategy combination described
in Section 3. Lemma 2 implies that when c = v+ ², the eternal cooperation is possible,
while when v+ ² > c, only the stochastic cooperation is possible. Therefore we explain
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the intuition of the characterization of the lower bound of ± for two cases separately.
The formal proof is in Appendix B.
First, consider the case that c = v + ² so that the optimal value of the cooperation
phase is c
1¡± . The value of the optimal one-shot deviation is
maxfg + ± v
1¡ ± ; g + ±Wg:
As ± increases from 0 to 1, both of these values increase, but the value of the cooperation
phase is more convex than the optimal one-shot deviation value. (See Figure 2.9) There
are two cases of how c=(1¡ ±) intersects with the deviation value.
If ±D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²), that is,
±D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²) () ² 5 (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)
g ¡ v ; (7)
then c=(1¡±) intersects with the one-shot deviation value when the latter is g+±v=(1¡
±), as shown in Figure 2(a). In this case, the eternal cooperation is sustained if and
only if
c
1¡ ± = maxfg + ±W; g + ±
v
1¡ ±g = g + ±
v
1¡ ± () ± = ±
D(v):
By contrast, if ² is large, so that ±D(v) > ±P (v; ²) (but still c = v+²), then c=(1¡±)
intersects with the deviation value when the latter is g+ ±W , as shown in Figure 2(b).
Let ±cW (v; ²) be the solution to
c
1¡ ± = g + ±W:
Then this ±cW (v; ²) is the lower bound of the discount factors to sustain the eternal
cooperation in the case of ±D(v) > ±P (v; ²). Since g + ±W > g + ± v
1¡± in this case,
when c
1¡± intersects with the deviation value, ±
cW (v; ²) is strictly greater than ±D(v),
as Figure 2(b) shows. Therefore, when c = v+ ², the eternal cooperation is sustained10
if and only if ± is not less than
±E(v; ²) := maxf±D(v); ±cW (v; ²)g
and this lower bound is never smaller than ±D(v). Note that it is possible to sustain
the stochastic cooperation (to cooperate until v + ² realizes) under c = v + ² as well,
GRIPS Policy Information Center Discussion Paper : 09-10
14
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
10
15
20
25
30
35
g
c
c
1¡±
±±
P (v; ²)±D(v)
=
±E(v; ²)
g + ±W -
g + ± v1¡±
@I
eternal cooperation-
2(a): ² 5 (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)=(g ¡ v)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
10
15
20
25
30
g
c
±
c
1¡±
±P (v; ²) ±cW (v; ²)
=
±E(v; ²)
±D(v)
g + ±W-
g + ± v1¡±@I
eternal cooperation-
2(b): (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)=(g ¡ v) < ²
Figure 2: Less Cooperation under Stochastic Outside Options (c = v + ²)
but higher ± is needed because the value of the stochastic cooperation is smaller than
c=(1¡ ±).
Second, consider the case that v+² > c so that the optimal value of the cooperation
phase is c + ±V . Note that in this case c + ±V is uniformly greater than the eternal
cooperation value c
1¡± for any ± > 0. Again, there are two possibilities of how the
cooperation value intersects with the deviation value, maxfg+±W; g+± v
1¡±g. If c+±V
intersects with the deviation value when the latter is g + ± v
1¡± , let ±
V (v; ²) be the
solution to
c+ ±V = g + ±
v
1¡ ± :
Then c+±V > c=(1¡±) for all ± > 0 implies that ±V (v; ²) < ±D(v). (See Figure 3(a).11)
If c + ±V intersects with the deviation value when the latter is g + ±W , the inter-
section is computed as follows:
c+ ±V = g + ±W () ±(V ¡W ) = g ¡ c () ± = 2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d : (8)
Notice that v > (g + d)=2 if and only if 2(g¡c)
g¡d < ±
D(v). Let us de¯ne
±S(v; ²) := maxf±V (v; ²); 2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d g:
9The parameter values are (g; c; d; `; v) = (10; 8; 3; 2; 5) and ² = 1 for 2(a) and ² = 1:9 for 2(b).
10To be precise, Player 2's deviations must be checked. This is done in the formal proof of Propo-
sition 2.
11The parameter values are (g; c; d; `; v) = (7; 6; 1; 0:1; 5) and ² = 1:5 for 3(a) and ² = 3:5 for 3(b).
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Figure 3: More Cooperation under Stochastic Outside Options (v + ² > c)
Then the stochastic cooperation is sustained if and only if ± = ±S(v; ²). Since ±V (v; ²) <
±D(v), the lower bound ±S(v; ²) is strictly smaller than ±D(v) if and only if v > (g+d)=2.
Therefore, even when one of the options is very attractive, if the one-shot gain g from
defection is not too large, then Player 1 with a mid-range ± who would not cooperate
under the deterministic option would cooperate under the stochastic outside options,
as long as she is in the game. This is because the value of stochastic cooperation,
c+ ±V , is increased by the outside option more than that of the optimal deviation.
Proposition 2. Case 1: Suppose that c = v + ². Then the eternal cooperation is
sutsained if and only if ± = ±E(v; ²), where ±E(v; ²) = ±D(v).
Case 2: Suppose that v + ² > c. Then the stochastic cooperation is sustained if and
only if ± = ±S(v; ²). Moreover, ±S(v; ²) < ±D(v) if and only if v > (g + d)=2.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note, however, that even though ±S(v; ²) < ±D(v) for Case 2, still ±S(v; ²) = 2(g¡c)
g¡d >
g¡c
g¡d = ± holds. Therefore, the existence of outside options in any form makes it
more di±cult to achieve mutual cooperation than in the ordinary repeated game. The
\locked-in" feature of repeated games is a strong device to enforce mutual cooperation.
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4.2. Mean E®ect and Perturbation E®ect
Let us consider comparative statics when the mean v or the spread ² of the outside
option distribution changes. Essentially, the increase of the mean v increases the option
value of the punishment phase more than that of the cooperation phase. Therefore the
increase of the mean makes cooperation more di±cult, just like in the deterministic
option case. By contrast, the change of the spread ² is relevant only when Player 1
wants to wait for the good option. Therefore the perturbation e®ect of ² is not apparent
and is in fact quite complex, which we show below.
The increase of the mean v of the outside options is always a bad news for coop-
eration. To see this, let us distinguish two ranges: v + ² 5 c and v + ² > c, given
an ². When v is small so that v + ² 5 c (i.e., the on-path value is c=(1 ¡ ±)), only
the deviation value maxfg + ±W; g + ± v
1¡±g increases as v increases. Hence ±E(v; ²) is
increasing in v.
In the range of v + ² > c, the on-path value c+ ±V also increases as v increases, so
that we need to see the relative change between the on-path value and the punishment
phase. The relationship between c+ ±V and g+ ±W does not change when v changes,
since the critical value of ± is 2(g¡c)
g¡d and is independent of v. The relationship between
c+ ±V and g + ± v
1¡± is seen as follows.
c+ ±V = g + ± v
1¡ ±
() ± (1¡ ±)(c¡ v) + ²
(2¡ ±)(1¡ ±) = g ¡ c: (9)
Notice that the LHS of (9) is increasing in ± and decreasing in v. Therefore, ±V (v; ²)
is increasing in v. This means that although v increases both the value of stochastic
cooperation c+±V and the deviation value g+± v
1¡± , the increase in the latter dominates.
In sum, the increase in the mean of the outside options always makes cooperation more
di±cult. This is consistent with the deterministic case.
By contrast, the perturbation e®ect of ² is more complex, since it only a®ects the
value when Player 1 wants to wait for the good option, i.e., given ± and v, the increase
of ² increases V and W only. There are two important thresholds for ². First, ² 5 c¡v
implies that c
1¡± is the cooperation value, and ² > c ¡ v implies that c + ±V is the
cooperation value. Second, recall that
±P (v; ²) < ±D(v) () ² > (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)
g ¡ v ;
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which changes the optimal deviation value. Depending on whether v > (g + d)=2 or
not, the two thresholds are ordered di®erently:
v >
g + d
2
() 0 < c¡ v < (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)
g ¡ v ;
v 5 g + d
2
() 0 < (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)
g ¡ v 5 c¡ v:
Moreover, as we recall from (8),
v >
g + d
2
() 2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d < ±
D(v):
Therefore, we have two fundamentally di®erent cases depending on whether v > (g +
d)=2 or not.
Case 1: v > (g + d)=2, so that 0 < c¡ v < (v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v .
For any ² 2 [0; c¡ v], ±D(v) < ±P (v; ²) which implies that
maxfg + ±W; g + ± v
1¡ ±g = g + ±
v
1¡ ± :
Hence the lower bound is ±D(v).
For any ² > c¡v, the optimal on-path value is c+±V , which increases as ² increases.
Clearly, as long as ² 5 (v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v , still ±
D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²) holds so that the critical ± is
when c+±V intersects with g+± v
1¡± , as we have seen in Figure 3(a). Since the on-path
value c+ ±V is increasing in ² but the deviation value is independent of ², this critical
value ±V (v; ²) is decreasing in ². (This can be also seen from (9).) Thus the lower bound
of the discount factors that sustain the stochastic cooperation decreases as the spread
² increases. When ² becomes large enough,12 the relevant lower bound is determined
by c+ ±V = g + ±W , which is a constant, 2(g ¡ c)=(g ¡ d).
This is graphically shown in Figure 4(a).13 It shows that for mid-range ± 2
(2(g¡c)
g¡d ; ±
D(v)), the increase of ² changes no cooperation into the stochastic cooper-
ation. Therefore the perturbation enhances cooperation.
Case 2: v 5 (g + d)=2, so that 0 < (v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v 5 c¡ v.
In this case, we divide [0; c¡v] into two intervals, [0; (v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v ] and (
(v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v ; c¡v].
For ² 2 [0; (v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v ], as in Case 1, ±
D(v) is the lower bound. For ² 2 ( (v¡d)(c¡v)
g¡v ; c¡ v],
12The critical level is beyond ² = (v¡d)(c¡v)g¡v , because even if ±
P (v; ²) = ±D(v), that does not imply
that c+ ±V intersects with g + ±W at that ².
13The parameter values are (g; c; d; `; v) = (8; 6; 1; 0:9; 5)
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Figure 4: Perturbation E®ect
±P (v; ²) < ±D(v) holds so that the critical ± is when c=(1¡ ±) intersects with g + ±W ,
as in Figure 2(b). This ±cW (v; ²) is increasing in ² since the deviation value g + ±W is
increasing in ², while c=(1¡ ±) is independent of ².
When ² > c¡v, then the optimal on-path value is c+±V and the optimal deviation
value is still g + ±W . Thus the lower bound is a constant, 2(g ¡ c)=(g ¡ d). This is
graphically shown in Figure 4(b).14 It shows that for any ±, the increase in ² does not
enhance cooperation.
To highlight the positive e®ect of perturbation, we summarize as follows.
Corollary 2. When v > (g+d)=2, for any ± such that 2(g¡c)
gd)
< ± < ±D(v), there exists
²(±) (the solution to ±V (v; ²) = ±) such that for any ² = ²(±), stochastic cooperation is
sustained while for any 0 5 ² < ²(±) no cooperation is possible.
The ordinary repeated game literature looks only at the vertical axis of Figure 4,
where ² = 0, and the case of v = d. By adding the dimension of (v; ²), we enlarged the
scope of the analysis and found the positive e®ect of payo® perturbation.
Our result is di®erent from the e®ect of stochastic discount factor (Dal B¶o, 2007),
which a®ects both the cooperation phase value and the punishment phase value, and
that of stochastic payo®s in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). As we discussed in Intro-
duction, their results can be interpreted as the eternal cooperation being more di±cult
under volatility. We have provided a third source of volatility via the outside options
14The parameter values are (g; c; d; `; v) = (8; 6; 3; 0:9; 5)
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and expanded the notion of \repeated cooperation" to include not only the eternal
cooperation but also the stochastic cooperation. Then we can show that in some cases
cooperation is enhanced under more volatility.
Yasuda and Fujiwara-Greve (2009) shows a similar result for ordinary repeated
games with perturbed payo®s. Essentially, if the volatility of the payo®s takes the form
that stopping cooperation in that period is bene¯cial, then players can still selectively
cooperate in some periods, even if they cannot cooperate under no perturbation.
4.3. General Binary Distributions with a Preserved Mean
We extend the analysis to a general binary distribution to incorporate more realistic
situations, as well as to generalize the arrival probability of the attractive option. For
example, in employment relationships, most of the time the outside option is not so
good, but once in a while a very attractive outside option may arrive. If the probability
of the good outside option is very small, there is not much discrepancy between the
stochastic cooperation and the eternal cooperation, and the change in the lower bound
of the discount factor has a signi¯cant meaning.
Although there are many ways to formulate a general binary distribution with a
¯xed mean v, we use the following formulation. Suppose that there are two outside
options v+ > v¡, which obtain with probability p and 1 ¡ p respectively at the end
of each period. As before, the option v+ (resp. v¡) indicates that a stationary payo®
sequence fv+; v+; : : :g (resp. fv¡; v¡; : : :g) is given, or a one-shot payo® of v+
1¡± (resp.
v¡
1¡± ) is given. To keep the mean v = pv
++(1¡p)v¡ between d and c, we ¯x15 v¡ (< v)
and v 2 (d; c) and let v+(p) = (v ¡ v¡)=p+ v¡. Note that v+(p) becomes a decreasing
function of p > 0. For notational simplicity we often write v+ when there is no danger
of confusion. As before we ¯nd conditions for the simple trigger strategy combination
to be a SPE.
Let V (p) (given v and v¡) be the value in the cooperation phase, measured at the
end of a period before a stochastic option arrives, when Player 1 takes only the good
outside option v+ in any period during the cooperation phase. It has the following
recursive structure.
V (p) = p
v+
1¡ ± + (1¡ p)fc+ ±V (p)g:
15If we ¯x v+ instead, then the decrease of lower bound as p increases is rather obvious, since p
increases the value of waiting for the better option in both cooperation phase and punishment phase
in the same way. A more interesting case is the one we analyze here, in which the good option's value
decreases when its probability increases.
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Therefore
V (p) =
pv+ + (1¡ p)(1¡ ±)c
(1¡ ±)f1¡ (1¡ p)±g : (10)
Using this, we characterize the optimal exit strategy in the cooperation phase. The
proof is essentially the same as that of Lemma 2 and is thus omitted.
Lemma 4. When (C;C) is expected as long as the game continues, not taking any
outside option is the optimal exit strategy for Player 1 if c = v+, and taking only v+
(and therefore exiting with probability p) is optimal otherwise.
Therefore, the only condition to determine the optimal exit strategy in the cooper-
ation phase is whether the best option exceeds c, regardless of its probability. This is a
generalization of Lemma 2. In fact, this can be generalized for continuous distributions
as well. See Section 5.2.
If (D;D) is expected forever after, the optimal exit strategy for Player 1 depends
on the outside option distribution as follows. Let W (p) be the value when Player 1
takes only the better outside option v+ during the punishment phase (given v and v¡).
It satis¯es
W (p) = p
v+
1¡ ± + (1¡ p)fd+ ±W (p)g:
Hence
W (p) =
pv+ + (1¡ p)(1¡ ±)d
(1¡ ±)f1¡ (1¡ p)±g : (11)
By the same logic of Lemma 3, the optimal exit strategy in the punishment phase is
to wait for the good option v+ if and only if
W (p) = v
1¡ ± () ±v + (1¡ ±)d = v
¡:
Thus we have the following characterization.
Lemma 5. When (D;D) is expected as long as the game continues, waiting for the
better outside option v+ is the optimal exit strategy for Player 1 if
±v + (1¡ ±)d = v¡; or ± = maxfv
¡ ¡ d
v ¡ d ; 0g; (12)
and taking any outside option is optimal otherwise.
Note that (12) does not depend on the probability of the good option p and is a
generalization of (6). As before, we divide the analysis into two cases: v+ 5 c so that
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the eternal cooperation is possible and v+ > c so that only the stochastic cooperation
is possible.
First, suppose that v+ 5 c, i.e., p = (v¡ v¡)=(c¡ v¡). The optimal value function
on the play path is c=(1 ¡ ±). The value of a one-step deviation is g + ±W (p) if (12)
holds, and it is g+ ±v=(1¡ ±) otherwise. Let ±cW (p) be the critical discount factor that
satisfy
c
1¡ ± = g + ±W (p):
Then the eternal cooperation is sustained, i.e.,
c
1¡ ± = maxfg + ±W (p); g + ±
v
1¡ ±g (13)
is satis¯ed for any ± = maxf±cW (p); ±D(v)g =: ±E(p), which is not smaller than ±D(v).
This is a generalization of Proposition 2, Case 1.
Second, suppose that v+ > c, or p < (v ¡ v¡)=(c ¡ v¡). We investigate the lower
bound of ± that sustains the stochastic cooperation, i.e., that satisfy
c+ ±V (p) = maxfg + ±W (p); g + ± v
1¡ ±g: (14)
For the range of ± such that v=(1¡±) = W (p), the increase in the on-path value implies
that the lower bound of ± is less than ±D(v). Formally, let ±V (p) be the solution to
c+ ±V (p) = g + ±
v
1¡ ± :
Then ±V (p) < ±D(v) since c+ ±V (p) > c
1¡± for any ± > 0. For the range of ± such that
W (p) > v=(1¡±), both on-path value and the punishment value increase, as compared
to the deterministic case. Let us ¯nd the smallest ± that satisfy
c+ ±V (p) = g + ±W (p):
By computation,
c+ ±V (p) = g + ±W (p);
() ±fV (p)¡W (p)g = g ¡ c;
() ±fpv
+ + (1¡ p)(1¡ ±)cg ¡ fpv+ + (1¡ p)(1¡ ±)dg
(1¡ ±)f1¡ (1¡ p)±g = g ¡ c;
() ±(1¡ p)(c¡ d) = f1¡ (1¡ p)±g(g ¡ c);
() ± = g ¡ c
(1¡ p)(g ¡ d) =: ±
VW (p): (15)
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Therefore
g ¡ c
(1¡ p)(g ¡ d) < ±
D(v) () v > pg + (1¡ p)d: (16)
The condition (16) is a generalization of v > (g + d)=2 in Proposition 2. Since
g > c > v > d, it is easier to be satis¯ed for small p, namely when p < (v¡ d)=(g¡ d).
(Note that this condition is compatible with v+(p) > c.) In summary we have the
following generalization of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Case 1: Suppose that c = v+(p). Then the eternal cooperation is
sustained if and only if ± = ±E(p) and ±E(p) = ±D(v).
Case 2: Suppose that v+(p) > c. Then the stochastic cooperation with exit probability p
is sustained if and only if ± = ±S(p) := maxf±VW (p); ±V (p)g. Moreover, ±S(p) < ±D(v)
if and only if v > pg + (1¡ p)d.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Let us investigate the e®ect of p. Since p changes both the probability of the good
option v+(p) as well as its value, the e®ect of p is clearly not monotonic. We are most
interested in the case when p is very small so that the stochastic cooperation is almost
the eternal cooperation. Recall that when v+(p) > c, the stochastic cooperation (that
ends with probability p) is sustained if and only if
± = maxf±VW (p); ±V (p)g =: ±S(p):
From (15), ±VW (p) is increasing in p. To check that ±V (p) is also increasing, note that
by computation, V (p) is decreasing in p for any ±:
@V (p)
@p
=
1
(1¡ ±)f1¡ ± + p±g2
h
v¡ ¡ ±v ¡ (1¡ ±)c
i
< 0:
Since g + ± v
1¡± does not change as p changes, the intersection with c + ±V (p) moves
to the right, i.e., ±V (p) is increasing in p. Therefore, ±S(p) = maxf±VW (p); ±V (p)g is
increasing in p, when v+(p) > c. Moreover, if maxfv¡¡d
v¡d ; 0g 5 ±, then ±S(p) = ±VW (p),
and (15) implies that this bound converges to ± as p approaches to 0. Hence we have
the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 4. (i) In the region of p such that v+(p) > c, ±S(p) decreases as p
decreases.
(ii) If maxfv¡¡d
v¡d ; 0g 5 ±, then limp!0 ±S(p) = ±.
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To interpret (i), when the exit probability p becomes very small and v+(p) becomes
very large, cooperation is enhanced in two ways: the duration of the stochastic coop-
eration becomes longer and the lower bound of the discount factors becomes smaller.
The result (ii) means that when p is very small, the outside option has almost no e®ect.
We are back to the repeated game situation because, under the assumption, in both
cooperation phase and punishment phase Player 1 waits for the good option but it
hardly arrives. This can be also interpreted as robustness of folk theorem in the sense
that even if players are free to exit strategically, if the option is negligible the players
are as if con¯ned in the repeated game and the cooperation is sustained under the
same condition.
5. EXTENSIONS
5.1. Two-Sided Outside Options
We extend the model so that Player 2 also has non-negligible outside options. When
both players can choose to take outside options, the rule of termination of a repeated
game becomes relevant. The unilateral ending rule assumed in the one-sided option
model (Table 4(a)) has a speci¯c meaning in the two-sided option model that the re-
peated game ends if and only if at least one player chooses to exit (Table 4(b)). There
is an intermediate case of two-sided option model in which both players must agree to
end the game, but in that case it is straightforward to prove that any equilibrium out-
come of ordinary repeated game can be sustained.16 Therefore the essentially di®erent
models from ordinary repeated games are the one-sided option model and two-sided
option model with the unilateral ending rule. Moreover, the unilateral ending rule
is the most commonly analyzed rule (e.g., Gosh and Ray, 1996, Kranton, 1996a,b,
Fujiwara-Greve, 2002, and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) and describes
well situations such as joint ventures and lender-borrower relationships.
First, consider the deterministic option model. Let v1; v2 2 (d; c) be the outside
options for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively. By the same argument as in Section 3,
16For example, repeated (C;C) can be achieved by the following strategy combination if two players
must agree to end the game: Play C and do not take outside options as long as no one played D.
If someone played D in the past, play D and do not take outside options. Since one player cannot
unilaterally end the game to escape, the strategy combination is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and
only if the usual grim-trigger strategy combination is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the ordinary
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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P1 n P2
Stay Continue
Exit End
P1 n P2 Stay Exit
Stay Continue End
Exit End End
4(a): One-sided Option 4(b): Two-sided Option
for P1 with Unilateral Ending Rule
Table 4: Game Continuation Patterns
the maximal equilibrium punishment is to exit immediately after the observation of D.
Under this punishment, Player i would not play C if ± < ±Di (vi) =:
g¡c
g¡vi . The range of
discount factors that sustains mutual cooperation is ± = maxf±D1 (v1); ±D2 (v2)g, which
is weakly narrower than the one in the one-sided outside option model, since ±Di (¢)
is increasing. Therefore it becomes more di±cult to sustain cooperation when both
players have deterministic outside options, since both players must be patient enough
to stay and cooperate.
Second, let us consider the case that both Player 1 and Player 2 have °uctuating
but deterministic outside options. By the same argument as in Section 3, mutual
cooperation falls apart if there is a known time period at which one of the players
receives an outside option greater than v¤(±). Hence we can interpret that cooperation
becomes more di±cult in the sense that there are more cases of °uctuating outside
options that includes v > v¤(±) for at least one player.
Third, suppose that Player 1 and Player 2 independently draw stochastic outside
options from the same i.i.d. distribution. Since the qualitative results are the same, we
focus on the simple distribution such that v+ ² obtains with probability 1=2 and v¡ ²
obtains with probability 1=2, independently to each player. Under the independent
draws, a player may take an outside option when the other player does not want to, so
that the game ends with a di®erent probability and the payo® becomes di®erent from
the one in the one-sided outside option case. Speci¯cally, if both players want to take
only v + ² in the punishment phase, the continuation value W 0, measured at the end
of a period, satis¯es the following recursive structure.
W 0 =
1
2
¡v + ²
1¡ ±
¢
+
1
4
¡v ¡ ²
1¡ ±
¢
+
1
4
(d+ ±W 0): (17)
This is because with probability 1=4, one's option turns out to be v¡² but the partner's
turned out to be v + ², in which case the game ends and one ends up with the low
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= g + ±W 0 @R
±P (v; ²)
¾ ±E(v; ²)
±
5(b): (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)=(g ¡ v) < ²
Figure 5: More Cooperation under Two-Sided Outside Options (c = v + ²)
option.
Lemma 6. For any (v; ²), the one-shot deviation values are ordered as follows.
± 5 ±P (v; ²) ) g + ± v
1¡ ± = g + ±W
0 = g + ±W ;
±P (v; ²) 5 ± ) g + ±W = g + ±W 0 = g + ± v
1¡ ± :
Proof: See Appendix B. (See also Figure 5.17)
Since the punishment phase value is now maxfg+ ±W 0; g+ ± v
1¡±g, it is smaller than
the punishment phase value for the one-sided option model. Therefore, when c = v+ ²
so that the eternal cooperation is to be sustained, the decrease of the punishment phase
value makes the eternal cooperation easier, as Figure 5 shows.
By contrast, when v+ ² > c, both the value in the cooperation phase and the value
in the punishment phase may decrease. The continuation value in the cooperation
phase, measured at the end of a period, satis¯es
V 0 =
1
2
¡v + ²
1¡ ±
¢
+
1
4
¡v ¡ ²
1¡ ±
¢
+
1
4
(c+ ±V 0); (18)
17The parameter combination is (g; c; d; `; v; ²) = (10; 8; 0:5; 0:1; 5; 0:1) for 5(a) and (g; c; d; `; v; ²) =
(10; 8; 0:5; 0:1; 4; 3:4) for 5(b).
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±P (v; ²)
6=
±D(v) 4(g¡c)
g¡d
6
Figure 6: Less Cooperation under Two-Sided Outside Options (v + ² > c)
while the one-sided case value can be decomposed as
V =
1
2
¡v + ²
1¡ ±
¢
+
1
4
(c+ ±V ) +
1
4
(c+ ±V ):
Notice that c > v implies c+ ±V > (v ¡ ²)=(1¡ ±), which in turn implies that V > V 0
from the above comparison.
Thus, when the stochastic cooperation is to be sustained, both the on-path value
c + ±V 0 and the punishment phase value, maxfg + ±W 0; g + ± v
1¡±g, are reduced, as
compared to the one-sided option model. Let ±V
0
(v; ²) be the solution to
c+ ±V 0 = g + ±
v
1¡ ± :
Then c+ ±V > c+ ±V 0 implies that ±V (v; ²) < ±V
0
(v; ²). On the other hand,
c+ ±V 0 = g + ±W 0 () ±(V 0 ¡W 0) = g ¡ c () ± = 4(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d >
2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d :
Therefore, the lower bound ±S2(v; ²) := maxf±V 0(v; ²); 4(g¡c)
g¡d g that sustains the stochas-
tic cooperation under the two-sided options is greater than ±S(v; ²). (See Figure 6.18)
18The parameter combination is (g; c; d; `; v; ²) = (7; 6; 0:2; 0:1; 5; 1:5).
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Proposition 5. Case 1: Suppose that c = v+². Let ±E2(v; ²) be the lower bound of the
discount factors that sustain the eternal cooperation under two-sided outside options.
Then ±E2(v; ²) 5 ±E(v; ²).
Case 2: Suppose that v + ² > c. Let ±S2(v; ²) be the lower bound of the discount
factors that sustain the stochastic cooperation under two-sided outside options. Then
±S2(v; ²) > ±S(v; ²).
For the two-sided option model, we only need to check Player 1's optimization,
which is analogous to the one in Proposition 2 and is explained above. Therefore the
proof is omitted.
In summary, under two-sided independent stochastic outside options, the e®ects of
perturbation are weakened relative to the one-sided case, because a player may not be
able to wait for a good option when she wanted to, which reduces the value of options.
However, the weaker e®ect of perturbation means that the eternal cooperation becomes
less di±cult and the stochastic cooperation becomes more di±cult than the one-sided
option case. The weaker e®ect is obtained as long as the option value is reduced, even
if the outside options are not independent.
5.2. Continuum of Outside Options
The binary distribution models illustrate well the essence of the e®ect of stochastic
outside options on the cooperation within the repeated game. However, it is of some
theoretical interest how the model and results extend to a case with a continuum
of outside options, which is more standard in some economic models such as search
models. We show that the stochastic cooperation is sustained under lower discount
factors than those of the deterministic model even under a continuum of outside options.
Let us go back to the one-sided outside option model and assume that Player 1
has a continuum of outside options with the support [v; v]. That is, at the end of each
period, an option x 2 [v; v] realizes for Player 1 and if she takes this option, she receives
the payo® x forever after, or a one-shot payo® of x
1¡± . Let F be the (di®erentiable)
cumulative distribution function of the outside options and f be its density function.
Assume, as before, that the mean outside option v :=
R v
v
xf(x)dx is strictly between d
and c.
If Player 1 takes an option of value x, then she would also take any option greater
than x. Hence the optimal exit strategy is a reservation strategy: Player 1 takes any
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outside option not less than a certain level r, where r is called the reservation level.
Suppose that as long as Player 1 is in the game, she can receive u from the Prisoner's
Dilemma, where u can be either c or d. Let U(u; r) be the value, at the end of a period
before a stochastic outside option realizes, and when Player 1 takes any option not less
than r 2 [v; v]. It satis¯es the following recursive equation:
U(u; r) =
Z v
r
x
1¡ ±f(x)dx+ F (r)fu+ ±U(u; r)g: (19)
By di®erentiation of (19) with respect to r, we have
@U(u; r)
@r
= ¡ r
1¡ ±f(r) + f(r)fu+ ±U(u; r)g+ ±F (r)
@U(u; r)
@r
;
() @U(u; r)
@r
=
f(r)
1¡ ±F (r)
£
u¡ r
1¡ ± + ±U(u; r)
¤
:
The optimal reservation level, denoted as r¤(u; ±), is the solution to @U(u;r)
@r
= 0 (since
the second order condition holds), that is,
r¤(u; ±)
1¡ ± = u+ ±U(u; r
¤(u; ±)): (20)
This means that the optimal reservation level of the outside options is exactly where
Player 1 is indi®erent between taking it and not taking it. (19) and (20) imply that
r¤(u; ±)
1¡ ± = u+ ±U(u; r
¤(u; ±))
() r¤(u; ±) = (1¡ ±)u+ ±(1¡ ±)
nZ v
r¤(u;±)
x
1¡ ±f(x)dx+ F (r
¤(u; ±))
r¤(u; ±)
1¡ ±
o
:
Hence, for any ± 2 (0; 1) and any u = c; d, the optimal reservation level r¤(u; ±) is the
solution to the following equation:
r = (1¡ ±)u+ ±
Z v
r
xf(x)dx+ ±F (r)r: (21)
By di®erentiation it is straightforward to show that the RHS of (21) is a monotone
increasing function of r, taking value from (1 ¡ ±)u + ±v to (1 ¡ ±)u + ±v. Figure 7
illustrates this property. Therefore, in the cooperation phase where u = c, the optimal
reservation level r¤(c; ±) is less than v if and only if (1¡±)c+±v > v, which is equivalent
to v > c.
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Figure 7: Optimal Reservation Level (F =UNIF[0; 10], ± = 0:8, u = 0)
Lemma 7. When (C;C) is expected as long as the game continues, the optimal exit
strategy for Player 1 is to not to take any outside option if c = v, and to take any
outside option not less than r¤(c; ±) otherwise.
In the following we focus on the stochastic cooperation, i.e., we assume that v > c
and give a su±cient condition under which the lower bound of the discount factors
that sustain the stochastic cooperation is less than ±D(v).
The equation (21) implies that in the punishment phase when u = d, the optimal
reservation level is v (that is, it is optimal to exit by taking any option) if and only if
v = (1¡ ±)d+ ±
Z v
v
xf(x)dx+ ±F (v)v = (1¡ ±)d+ ±v;
which is equivalent to
± 5 v ¡ d
v ¡ d:
This corresponds to ± 5 ±P (v; ²) for the binary case. If
±D(v) 5 v ¡ d
v ¡ d () (v ¡ d)(g ¡ v) = (g ¡ c)(v ¡ d); (22)
then the on-path value c+ ±U(c; r¤(c; ±)) (which is strictly greater than c
1¡± under the
assumption v > c) intersects with the one-shot deviation value when this is g + ± v
1¡± ,
as in Figure 3 (a). Hence the lower bound of the discount factors that deter Player
1's deviation is strictly less than ±D(v). In addition, if we impose an extra condition,
Player 2 does not deviate either.
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Proposition 6. Assume that v > c, (22), and v > f1¡ F (c)gg. Let ±F be the lower
bound of ± that sustains the stochastic cooperation under the continuum of outside
options. Then ±F < ±D(v).
Proof: See Appendix B.
We have shown that there is a case of continuum outside options in which the
stochastic cooperation is sustained under lower discount factors than those of the de-
terministic model.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our result can be summarized in three points. First, payo® perturbation may en-
hance cooperation, which is a new insight. In the literature of ordinary repeated games,
only in¯nitely-repeated cooperation has been analyzed and thus payo® perturbation
has negative e®ect, since perturbation increases the temptation to deviate at some
point. However if we extend the notion of \repeated cooperation" to include stochastic
repetition of cooperation and the perturbation of outside options is considered, a player
wants to wait for a high value, which makes him more patient.
Second, in the simple binary outside option model, the e®ect of the mean and the
spread are quite di®erent. The e®ect of the mean is monotone and negative in the sense
that the lower bound of the discount factors is increasing in v. By contrast, the e®ect of
the spread ² is more complex, as shown in Figure 4. For mid-range discount factors and
when the deviation gain is not too large, the increase of ² enhances cooperation, while
for other parameter combinations, the increase of ² makes cooperation more di±cult.
Therefore, the option structure is important.
Third, in the general binary outside option model, cooperation is enhanced in two
ways when a very good option arrives with a very small probability. The small proba-
bility implies that the stochastic cooperation is almost the eternal cooperation, and the
high value of the good option implies that the lower bound of the discount factors is
smaller than the one in the deterministic case. For some parameters, as the probability
of the good option converges to 0, the lower bound of the discount factors converges
to the one for the ordinary repeated game. Thus our model naturally connects to the
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
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We also found that one-sided and two-sided outside options have di®erent e®ects.
If both players have stochastic outside options, the relative di±culty of cooperation
is weakened as compared to the one-sided option case. The reason is as follows. If
both players can end the game unilaterally, the game ends more frequently and the
option value is reduced, since the partner may end the game when one does not want
to. This makes the cooperation easier if the punishment phase payo® is reduced but
more di±cult if the cooperation phase payo® is reduced.
Although the main concern in the present paper is to analyze the sustainability of
mutual cooperation under perturbations, it should also be of interest to characterize
the set of equilibrium payo®s. Especially, comparative static of the equilibrium payo®
sets with respect to the mean value and/or the spread of the outside options has great
importance. As we showed in Section 4.2, increased volatility of ² can make Player
1's cooperation easier, which implies that the set of equilibrium payo®s need not be
monotonically decreasing (in the sense of set inclusion) in the value of outside options.
This non-monotonicity of equilibrium payo®s as the outside options change may have
signi¯cant implications to applications, for example in policy e®ects.19
Finally, we would like to point out that there is a wide scope of important appli-
cations from our analysis. An important implication from our result is that speci¯ca-
tions of what players may receive outside of the game, such as potential wage o®ers or
reservation utilities for workers, can have signi¯cant e®ects on their in-game strategic
incentives. This ¯nding stands in sharp contrast to the traditional modeling approach
in dynamic games and contracting where the outside structure of a game is often as-
sumed to be ¯xed. We believe that our simple model can provide meaningful insights
and implications for many applications.
19There is a di®erent non-monotonicity result. In a class of games called exhaustible resource games,
Dutta (1995) showed that the ¯rst-best outcome is sustainable under a mid-range discount factor but
not under high discount factors.
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APPENDIX A: (C;C) CAN BE THE EASIEST TO SUSTAIN
In this Appendix, we give a su±cient condition under which repetition of (C;C) is
the easiest stationary action pro¯le to sustain.
For a set X, let ¢(X) be the set of all probability distributions over X. The set of
feasible payo® combinations is
F := f(u1; u2) 2 <2 j 9¾ 2 ¢(fC;Dg £ fC;Dg) such that ui = Eui(¾) 8i = 1; 2g:
For any feasible payo® combination u = (u1; u2), let ±(u) be the lower bound of ±
such that there exists a correlated action pro¯le ¾ 2 ¢(fC;Dg £ fC;Dg) such that
u = (Eu1(¾); Eu2(¾)) and the following strategy combination is a SPE:
Play Path: If the history is empty or there was no deviation from ¾ in the past, play
¾ and Player 1 uses an optimal exit strategy given that ¾ is repeated as long as the
game continues;
Punishment Phase: If there was a deviation from ¾, play (D;D) and Player 1 uses
an optimal exit strategy given that (D;D) is repeated as long as the game continues.
Lemma 8. If g ¡ c < d ¡ ` and c(g ¡ c) 5 (d ¡ `)(c ¡ v), then ±(c; c) 5 ±(u) for any
u 2 F such that u1 > v and u2 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 8: Fix any u 2 F . Depending on how u locates in F , the necessary
action pro¯les to be played in ¾ are di®erent. From Figure 8 we can see that:
(i) To attain a payo® combination in Area (i) on average, a correlated action pro¯le
must include (C;D) and (D;D) and either (C;C) or (D;C).
(ii) To attain a payo® combination in Area (ii) on average, a correlated action pro¯le
must include (C;D) and (C;C) and either (D;D) or (D;C).
(iii) To attain a payo® combination in Area (iii) on average, a correlated action pro¯le
must include (C;C) and (D;C) and either (C;D) or (D;D).
(iv) To attain a payo® combination in Area (iv) on average, a correlated action pro¯le
must include (D;D) and (D;C) and either (C;C) or (C;D).
We thus derive su±cient conditions for (C;C), (D;C), and (C;D) to be followed
and then apply them for each Area to determine the minimum su±cient ±.
Let (u1; u2) be the one-shot average payo® of a correlated action pro¯le on the play
path. In each period, one of the pure action pro¯les in the support gets to be realized.
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Figure 8: Areas in F
If (C;C) is supposed to be played in this period, and if Player 1 deviates to D, her
long-run payo® is g+±v=(1¡±) since they move to the punishment phase. If she follows
(C;C), the long-run payo® is c+ ±u1=(1¡ ±), since the expected one-shot payo® from
tomorrow on is u1. Hence Player 1 does not deviate from (C;C) if and only if
c+ ±
u1
1¡ ± = g + ±
v
1¡ ±
() ± = g ¡ c
(g ¡ c) + (u1 ¡ v) =: ±
CC
1 (u1): (23)
Similarly, Player 2 does not deviate from (C;C) if and only if
c+ ±
u2
1¡ ± = g + ± ¢ 0
() ± = g ¡ c
(g ¡ c) + u2 =: ±
CC
2 (u2): (24)
When (D;C) is supposed to be played, only Player 2 has an incentive to deviate.
He does not deviate from (D;C) if and only if
`+ ±
u2
1¡ ± = d+ ± ¢ 0
() ± = d¡ `
(d¡ `) + u2 =: ±
DC(u2): (25)
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When (C;D) is supposed to be played, only Player 1 has an incentive to deviate.
She does not deviate from (C;D) if and only if
`+ ±
u1
1¡ ± = d+ ±
v
1¡ ±
() ± = d¡ `
(d¡ `) + (u1 ¡ v) =: ±
CD(u1): (26)
In order to make these lower bounds less than 1, clearly we need u1 > v and u2 > 0.
Note that in general, f(x) = x=(A+ x) is an increasing function of x if and only if
A > 0.20 Therefore, if g ¡ c < d ¡ `, then ±CC1 (u1) < ±CD(u1) and ±CC2 (u2) < ±DC(u2)
hold simultaneously. Note also that v2 < v1 implies that if u1 = u2, then ±
CC
1 (u1) >
±CC2 (u2).
In order to make the players play a pure action pro¯le (C;C), we need
± = maxf±CC1 (u1); ±CC2 (u2)g =: ±CC(u). For players to play (D;C) (resp. (C;D)), we
only need ± = ±DC(u2) (resp. ± = ±CD(u1)). Similarly, for correlated action pro¯les,
we can classify the lower bound of ± as follows.
(i) In order to sustain (u1; u2) in Area (i) with as small ± as possible, we must have
at least ± = ±CD(u1) but also can use either (C;C) or (D;C) in the support of the
correlated action pro¯le. Hence the lowest ± is maxf±CD(u1);minf±CC(u); ±DC(u2)gg.
Under the assumption of g ¡ c < d¡ `, this lower bound is equal to ±CD(u1).
Now, in order to lower ±CD(u1) as much as possible in this area, we must increase
u1 as large as possible, which hits the boundary with all other areas (see Figure
8). From Figure 8 it is easy to see that we cannot increase u1 as much in Area
(i) as in Area (ii), i.e.,
min
u12Area (i)
±CD(u1) > min
u12Area (ii)
±CD(u1):
(ii) In order to sustain (u1; u2) in Area (ii), we need ± = maxf±CD(u1); ±CC(u)g, since
for this we can ignore (D;C) and use (D;D) instead in the support, which does
not require a high ±. Under the assumption of g ¡ c < d¡ `, this lower bound is
±CD(u1).
Again, in order to reduce ±CD(u1) as much as possible, we hit the boundary,
which is (C;C).
20By di®erentiation, f 0(x) = A=(A+ x)2.
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In summary so far, among the payo® combinations in the Area (i) and (ii), (C;C)
is the easiest to sustain. This is because in these areas, only Player 1's deviation must
be prevented and (C;C) gives the highest on-path average payo® for Player 1 in these
areas.
By contrast, in Areas (iii) and (iv), we need to prevent Player 2's deviation so that
the su±cient ±s are as follows.
(iii) For (u1; u2) in Area (iii), we need ± = maxf±DC(u2); ±CC(u)g = ±DC(u2).
(iv) For (u1; u2) in Area (iv), we need ± = maxf±DC(u2);minf±CC(u); ±CD(u1)gg =
±DC(u2).
To reduce ±DC(u2) as much as possible, we should increase u2. Hence the minimum
±DC(u2) is attained in Area (iii) where u2 = c. Recall that ±
CC
1 (c) > ±
CC
2 (c) since
v2 < v1. Hence (C;C) is the easiest to sustain in Area (iii) and (iv) if ±
DC(c) = ±CC1 (c).
This is equivalent to
d¡ `
(d¡ `) + c =
g ¡ c
(g ¡ c) + (c¡ v) () (d¡ `)(c¡ v) = c(g ¡ c):
Therefore, we have that if g ¡ c < d ¡ ` and (d ¡ `)(c ¡ v) = c(g ¡ c), then
±D(c; c) 5 ±D(u) for any u 2 F such that u1 > v and u2 > 0.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 2: Case 1: Assume that c = v + ². Recall that
c
1¡ ± = g + ±
v
1¡ ± () ± = ±
D(v) (2)
g + ±W = g + ± v
1¡ ± () ± = ±
P (v; ²) (6)
We also show that the on-path value function c=(1 ¡ ±) exceeds the deviation value
g + ±W for any ± above some critical ±. By computation,
c
1¡ ± = g + ±W;
c
1¡ ± = g + ±
v+²
1¡± + d
2¡ ± ;
() (2¡ ±)c = (1¡ ±)(2¡ ±)g + ±(v + ²) + ±(1¡ ±)d;
() h(±) := ¡±2(g ¡ d) + ±f3g ¡ (v + ²)¡ c¡ dg ¡ 2(g ¡ c) = 0:
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Notice that h is quadratic in ±, h(0) = ¡2(g ¡ c) < 0 and h(1) = c ¡ (v + ²) = 0.
Therefore there exists ±cW (v; ²) 2 (0; 1] such that for any ± = ±cW (v; ²), h(±) = 0 holds.
Thus,
c
1¡ ± = g + ±W () ± = ±
cW (v; ²): (27)
Note also that ±D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²) if and only if ² 5 (v ¡ d)(c ¡ v)=(g ¡ v). Now we
divide the analysis into two cases.
Case 1-a: 0 < ² 5 (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)=(g ¡ v), i.e., ±D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²).
In this case, the on-path value function c
1¡± intersects with g + ±
v
1¡± at ±
D(v) and
at that point v
1¡± > W . Hence (27) implies that c=(1 ¡ ±) exceeds g + ±W for any
± = ±D(v). Therefore c
1¡± = maxfg + ±W; g + ± v1¡±g if and only if ± = ±D(v). See
Figure 2(a).
Player 2's deviation value changes depending on whether Player 1 exits immediately
or not after seeing a deviation. If Player 1 exits immediately, i.e., if maxfW; v
1¡±g = v1¡± ,
Player 2's deviation value is g+ ± ¢ 0. In this case ± = ±D(v) implies that c=(1¡ ±) > g
so that Player 2's deviation is prevented.
If Player 1 waits for the good option in the punishment phase, i.e., if maxfW; v
1¡±g =
W , then Player 2's deviation value is increased to
g +
±
2
d+ (
±
2
)2d+ ¢ ¢ ¢ = g + ±d
2¡ ± :
In this case Player 2 does not deviate in the cooperation phase if and only if
c
1¡ ± = g +
±d
2¡ ± (28)
() h0(±) := ¡±2(g ¡ c) + ±(3g ¡ c¡ d)¡ 2(g ¡ c) = 0:
This h0 has the property that once it exceeds 0 at some ±, h0(±) = 0 for all larger ±.
Plug in ±D(v) and we get
h0(±D(v)) =
(g ¡ c)
(g ¡ v)2f(c¡ v)(v ¡ d) + v(g ¡ v)g > 0:
Therefore for any ± = ±D(v), (28) is satis¯ed. Note that this argument for Player 2
does not rely on the assumption that ±D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²).
In sum, when ±D(v) 5 ±P (v; ²), the eternal cooperation is sustained if and only if
± = ±D(v), that is ±S(v; ²) = ±D(v).
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Case 1-b: (v ¡ d)(c¡ v)=(g ¡ v) < ², i.e., ±P (v; ²) < ±D(v).
In this case, when the on-path value c=(1¡ ±) intersects with g + ± v
1¡± (at ±
D(v)),
the optimal one-shot deviation value is in fact g+±W . Thus the on-path value function
intersects with the optimal one-shot deviation value maxfg + ±W; g + ± v
1¡±g when the
latter is g+±W (see Figure 2(b)), at ±cW (v; ²). At this point v=(1¡±) < W . Therefore
from (2) and (27),
c
1¡ ± = maxfg + ±W; g + ±
v
1¡ ±g () ± = ±
cW (v; ²):
We show that ±cW (v; ²) > ±D(v). As we have seen,
h(±D(v)) =
(g ¡ c)
(g ¡ v)2f(c¡ v)(v ¡ d)¡ ²(g ¡ v)g:
Therefore for (v ¡ d)(c ¡ v)=(g ¡ v) < ², h(±D(v)) < 0. This means that ±cW (v; ²),
above which h(±) = 0, must be strictly greater than ±D(v).
Since Player 2 does not deviate in the cooperation phase if ± = ±D(v), we conclude
that when ±P (v; ²) < ±D(v), the eternal cooperation is sustained if and only if ± =
±cW (v; ²).
Case 2: Suppose that v + ² > c.
First, we show that there exists a unique ±V (v; ²) 2 (0; ±D(v)) such that for any
± = ±V (v; ²) (see Figure 3),
c+ ±V = g + ± v
1¡ ± :
Let
h(±; v; ²) := (1¡ ±)(2¡ ±)fc+ ±V ¡ g ¡ ± v
1¡ ±g
= ¡(g ¡ v)±2 + f3g ¡ 2c¡ (v ¡ ²)g± ¡ 2(g ¡ c):
Then
c+ ±V = g + ± v
1¡ ± () h(±; v; ²) = 0:
Since h(±; v; ²) is a concave, quadratic function of ±, h(0; v; ²) = ¡2(g ¡ c) < 0, and
h(1; v; ²) = ² > 0, there exists a unique ±V (v; ²) 2 (0; 1) such that for any ± = ±V (v; ²),
h(±; v; ²) = 0 holds. To show that ±V (v; ²) < ±D(v), plug in ± = ±D(v) into h and we
get
h(±D(v); v; ²) =
(g ¡ c)(v + ²¡ c)
g ¡ v > 0:
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Thus ±D(v) > ±V (v; ²).
Second, we show that Player 1 does not deviate for any ± = maxf±V (v; ²); 2(g¡c)
g¡d g.
Recall that from (8), we have that
c+ ±V = g + ±W () ± = 2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d :
Note that
2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d < ±
D(v) () g + d < 2v: (29)
Therefore
c+ ±V = maxfg + ±W; g + ± v
1¡ ±g
for any ± = maxf±V ; 2(g¡c)
g¡d g.
Next, consider Player 2. Let V2 be the continuation payo® during the cooperation
phase for Player 2. Since Player 1 exits with probability 1=2, it satis¯es
V2 =
1
2
fc+ ±V2g+ 1
2
¢ 0:
Thus V2 = c=(2¡ ±) and the on-path value for Player 2 is c+ ±V2 = c1¡±=2 .
If he deviates, Player 1 exits immediately if v=(1 ¡ ±) = W or equivalently ± 5
±P (v; ²), and Player 1 waits for the good option otherwise. Let W2 be the continuation
payo® during the punishment phase for Player 2, when Player 1 waits for the good
option. It satis¯es
W2 =
1
2
fd+ ±W2g+ 1
2
¢ 0;
so that W2 = d=(2¡ ±). Hence the one-shot deviation value for Player 2 is½
g + ± ¢ 0 if ± 5 ±P (v; ²)
g + ±W2 if ±
P (v; ²) 5 ±:
Since d = 0, it su±ces to show that the lower bound of ± that satis¯es
c+ ±V2 = g + ±W2
is less than ±D(v). Note that the payo® structure is similar for Player 2 and Player 1;
V2 ¡W2 = 1
2
fc+ ±V2g+ 1
2
¢ 0¡ 1
2
fd+ ±W2g ¡ 1
2
¢ 0;
and
V ¡W = 1
2
fc+ ±V g+ 1
2
¢ v + ²
1¡ ± ¡
1
2
fd+ ±Wg ¡ 1
2
¢ v + ²
1¡ ± :
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Hence V2 ¡W2 = V ¡W and since
c+ ±V = g + ±W () ± = 2(g ¡ c)
g ¡ d ;
Player 2 does not deviate if and only if ± = 2(g¡c)
g¡d .
Therefore ±S(v; ²) = maxf±V (v; ²); 2(g¡c)
g¡d g is the lower bound of the discount factor
that sustains the stochastic cooperation. Finally, note that ±S(v; ²) < ±D(v) if and only
if v > (g + d)=2.
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof is essentially analogous to that of Proposition 2.
Case 1: First we show that there exists ±cW (p) 2 (0; 1] such that
c
1¡ ± = g + ±W (p) () ± = ±
cW (p): (30)
By computation,
c
1¡ ± = g + ±W (p)
() fc¡ g(1¡ ±)gf1¡ (1¡ p)±g = ±pv+ + ±(1¡ p)(1¡ ±)d
() hp(±) := ¡(1¡ p)(g ¡ d)±2 + ±f(1¡ p)(g ¡ c) + g ¡ (1¡ p)d¡ pv+g ¡ (g ¡ c) = 0:
Again hp(¢) is a concave function of ±, hp(0) = ¡(g¡ c) < 0, and hp(1) = p(c¡v+) = 0
for any p 2 (0; 1). Therefore there exists a unique ±cW (p) 2 (0; 1] such that (30) holds.
From (12), we also have
W (p) = v
1¡ ± () ± =
v¡ ¡ d
v ¡ d :
Thus, depending on whether ±D(v) 5 v¡¡d
v¡d or
v¡¡d
v¡d < ±
D(v), we have slightly di®erent
arguments. When ±D(v) 5 v¡¡d
v¡d , the on-path value function c=(1 ¡ ±) intersects with
the optimal one-shot deviation value at ±D(v), since v=(1¡ ±) > W (p) at ±D(v). Hence
in this case Player 1 does not deviate if and only if ± = ±D(v). When v¡¡d
v¡d < ±
D(v), the
on-path value function intersects with the optimal one-shot deviation value at ±cW (p).
Let us show that ±cW (p) > ±D(v). Using v = pv+ + (1¡ p)v¡, we have
hp(±
D(v)) =
(1¡ p)(g ¡ c)
(g ¡ v)2 [(g ¡ v)(v
¡ ¡ d)¡ (g ¡ c)(v ¡ d)] < 0
since v
¡¡d
v¡d <
g¡c
g¡v = ±
D(v). Thus ±D(v) < ±cW (p).
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For Player 2, his deviation value is either g + ± ¢ 0 when ± < v¡¡d
v¡d so that Player 1
exits immediately after a deviation or g + ±W2(p) where W2(p) satis¯es
W2(p) = p ¢ 0 + (1¡ p)fd+ ±W2(p)g;
when ± = v¡¡d
v¡d so that Player 1 waits for v
+ in the punishment phase. In the former
case, ± = ±D(v) implies that c=(1 ¡ ±) > g, hence Player 2 does not deviate. In the
latter case, notice thatW (p) > W2(p) since v
+ > d = 0. Therefore Player 1's condition
c=(1¡ ±) = g + ±W (p) implies that Player 2 does not deviate either.
In summary, the eternal cooperation is sustained if and only if ± = ±E(p) :=
maxf±D(v); ±cW (p)g and ±E(p) = ±D(v).
Case 2: Let
h0p(±) := (1¡ ±)f1¡ (1¡ p)±gfc+ ±V (p)¡ g ¡ ±
v
1¡ ±g
= ¡(1¡ p)(g ¡ v)±2 + f¡p(g ¡ v+) + 2g ¡ c¡ vg± ¡ (g ¡ c):
Then
c+ ±V (p) = g + ± v
1¡ ± () h
0
p(±) = 0:
Since h0p(±) is a concave, quadratic function of ±, h
0
p(0) = ¡(g ¡ c) < 0, and h0p(1) =
p(v+ ¡ v) > 0, there exists a unique ±V (p) 2 (0; 1) such that for any ± = ±V (p),
h0p(±) = 0 holds. To show that ±V (p) < ±D(v), plug in ±D(v) into h0p and we obtain
h0p(±
D(v)) =
(g ¡ c)(v+ ¡ c)
g ¡ v > 0:
Hence ±V (p) < ±D(v).
Recall that c+ ±V (p) = g+ ±W (p) if and only if ± = g¡c
(1¡p)(g¡d) and this is less than
±D(v) under the assumption of (16). Therefore Player 1 does not deviate if and only
if ± = maxf±V (p); g¡c
(1¡p)(g¡d)g =: ±S(p) and this bound is less than ±D(v) if and only if
p < (v ¡ d)=(g ¡ d).
Next consider Player 2. Let V2(p) be the continuation value during the cooperation
phase for Player 2. Since Player 1 exits with probability p, it satis¯es
V2(p) = (1¡ p)fc+ ±V2(p)g+ p ¢ 0:
The on-path value for Player 2 is c + ±V2(p). Similarly, let W2(p) be the continuation
payo® during the punishment phase for Player 2, when Player 1 waits for the good
option. It satis¯es
W2(p) = (1¡ p)fd+ ±W2(p)g+ p ¢ 0:
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Thus the one-shot deviation value for Player 2 is½
g + ± ¢ 0 if v
1¡± = V (p)
g + ±W2(p) if V (p) = v1¡± :
Since d = 0, it su±ces to show that the lower bound of ± that satis¯es
c+ ±V2(p) = g + ±W2(p)
is less than ±D(v). As in the case of the 1=2-binary distribution, the payo® structure
is similar for Player 2 and Player 1;
V (p)¡W (p) = (1¡ p)fc+ ±V (p)g+ p v
+
1¡ ± ¡ (1¡ p)fd+ ±W (p)g ¡ p
v+
1¡ ±
while
V2(p)¡W2(p) = (1¡ p)fc+ ±V2(p)g ¡ (1¡ p)fd+ ±W2(p)g:
Hence
V (p)¡W (p) = V2(p)¡W2(p)
and thus
c+ V2(p) = g + ±W2(p) () ± = g ¡ c
(1¡ p)(g ¡ d) :
In summary, both players do not deviate if and only if ± = ±S(p) = maxf±V (p); g¡c
(1¡p)(g¡d)g.
Finally, note that p < (v ¡ d)=(g ¡ d) if and only if ±S(p) < ±D(v).
Proof of Lemma 6: From (17), we have
W 0 =
2(v + ²) + (v ¡ ²) + (1¡ ±)d
(1¡ ±)(4¡ ±) :
By computation
(
v
1¡ ± ¡W
0)(1¡ ±)(4¡ ±) = (4¡ ±)v ¡ 2(v + ²)¡ (v ¡ ²)¡ (1¡ ±)d
= ¡±(v ¡ d) + v ¡ d¡ ²;
so that
v
1¡ ± = W
0 () ± 5 ±P (v; ²): (31)
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Moreover, by comparing (5) and (17);
W =
1
2
¢ v + ²
1¡ ± +
1
4
(d+ ±W ) +
1
4
(d+ ±W )
W 0 =
1
2
¢ v + ²
1¡ ± +
1
4
¢ v ¡ ²
1¡ ± +
1
4
(d+ ±W 0)
) W ¡W 0 = d+ ±W ¡
v¡²
1¡±
4¡ ± :
Therefore W = W 0 if and only if
d+W = v ¡ ²
1¡ ±
() W = 1
2
¢ v + ²
1¡ ± +
1
2
(d+ ±W ) = 1
2
¢ v + ²
1¡ ± +
1
2
v ¡ ²
1¡ ± =
v
1¡ ±
() ± = ±P (v; ²):
Combined with (31), we have that
± 5 ±P (v; ²) ) g + ± v
1¡ ± = g + ±W
0 = g + ±W ;
±P (v; ²) 5 ± ) g + ±W = g + ±W 0 = g + ± v
1¡ ± :
Proof of Proposition 6: It su±ces to prove that Player 2 does not deviate under
± = ±F . Recall that Player 1 exits with probability 1 ¡ F (r¤(d; ±)) if the optimal
reservation level is r¤(d; ±). Hence Player 2's deviation value is(
g + ± ¢ 0 if ± 5 v¡d
v¡d
g + ± d
1¡±F (r¤(d;±)) if
v¡d
v¡d 5 ±:
Player 2's total expected payo® in the cooperation phase is
c
1¡ ±F (r¤(c; ±)) :
Since we have assumed that ±D(v) 5 v¡d
v¡d , it su±ces to show that the smallest ± that
satis¯es
c
1¡ ±F (r¤(c; ±)) = g (32)
is not more than ±D(v). By rearrangement, (32) is equivalent to
±F (r¤(c; ±))g = g ¡ c:
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We ¯rst prove that c < r¤(c; ±). Notice that v > c is equivalent toZ v
c
(x¡ c)f(x)dx > 0
()
Z v
c
xf(x)dx+ F (c)c > c
() (1¡ ±)c+ ±
Z v
c
xf(x)dx+ ±F (c)c > c:
This implies that at r = c, the RHS of (21) is above the 45 degree line. Hence the
intersection with the 45 degree line (which is r¤(c; ±)) is greater than c for any ±.
(See Figure 7.) Therefore we also have that F (c) < F (r¤(c; ±)) for any ±, and thus
v > f1¡ F (c)gg implies that
±F (r¤(c; ±))g > ±F (c)g > ±(g ¡ v):
Second, note that when ± = ±D(v), ±(g ¡ v) = g ¡ c. Therefore at ± = ±D(v),
±F (r¤(c; ±))g > g ¡ c;
and ±F (r¤(c; ±))g is uniformly greater than ±F (c)g for any ± 2 (0; 1). Thus there exists
±F2 < ±D(v) such that for any ± = ±F2, Player 2 does not deviate. Let ±F1 be the bound
for Player 1, then as shown in the text ±F1 < ±D(v) as well. Let ±F = maxf±F1; ±F2g
then this is the lower bound that sustains the stochastic cooperation and is strictly
smaller than ±D(v).
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